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ABSTRACT 
The war in Donbas has created large-scale displacement within Ukraine, an issue the 
impoverished state has struggled to manage. Internally displaced people (IDPs) have 
suffered from prejudice at the hands of host communities and from legal ambiguities 
caused by the state’s incoherent attempts at limiting the threat of mass displacement. 
This paper examines how the Ukrainian government-owned newspaper Uriadovyi 
Kurier represents the IDPs from Donbas and analyses what the publication’s attitudes 
towards internal displacement mean. Over time, a distinction appears in the 
newspaper’s reporting between real IDPs in need of help, and people posing as IDPs, 
guilty of siphoning Ukrainian tax payers’ money to the rebel-held areas. Also, the paper 
eagerly discusses how the European Union (EU) and foreign states can be engaged 
in providing support for the IDPs, relieving pressure from regional budgets and 
simultaneously binding Ukraine to the West. These tropes serve to construct Ukrainian 
national unity by excluding politically suspicious migrants from Donbas. They also 
excuse the state from making any structural adjustments or battling corruption as 
inadequate social protection can be replaced with foreign aid. 
 
Keywords: Ukraine, internally displaced persons, nation-building, ideological 
discourse analysis 
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INTRODUCTION: Ukraine’s second round with internal 
displacement 
 
“A whole scheme of fraudsters posing as internally displaced people and 
receiving millions of hryvnia from the state budget has been revealed,” Prime 
Minister Arseny Yatsenyuk, justifying halting the payment of social benefits to 
150,000 people in February 2016 (Ukrainska Pravda 2016). 
 
”I have come to meet folks with a very negative attitude to people from 
Donetsk. There were insults and reproaches, very unpleasant things. But then 
I resigned myself: it is impossible to prove myself for everyone, to be good for 
everyone.” Viktoria Kuznetsova, an internally displaced person from Donbas 
living in Kherson, interviewed by the BBC (Dorosh 2016). 
 
The war in the Donbas (portmanteau for Donetsk basin) region of Eastern 
Ukraine has created a type of person with whom Ukraine had only had fleeting 
experience prior to 2014: internally displaced person, or IDP. The Chernobyl 
nuclear disaster in 1986 forced some 350,000 people from their homes, but 
the scale of displacement following the armed clashes in Donbas is wholly 
different: by October 2015, there were about 1.5 million internally displaced 
people in Ukraine (Petryna 2013, 124; UNHCR 2015). The challenges of 
managing such a large-scale displacement are obviously enormous for an 
impoverished state, especially one experiencing conditions of war and rapid 
institutional change following the Euromaidan revolution. In addition to being 
a strain on resources, I argue that the displacement has had a definite role in 
Ukraine’s nation-building project, which has intensified after Euromaidan and 
especially the war in Donbas. A host of exclusionary discourses and practices 
towards IDPs, exemplified by the quotes above, have contributed to the 
formulation of a more unitary conception of the nation in Ukraine. 
 
For most of its independence, Ukraine has struggled to find a commonly 
accepted conception of the nation, with a population deeply divided on issues 
such as the country’s geopolitical orientation, constitutional choice (unitary or 
federal state), and state language laws. In this paper, I assess recent 
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developments in Ukraine’s nation-building project by concentrating on 
internally displaced people from Donbas as an object of state policies. The 
IDP as a figure poses a challenge for the statehood of any country: they 
acutely make visible the state’s inability to exert control over its own territory 
and question its monopoly on violence. Research on forced migration has 
shown that forced displacement in general is intimately connected to nation-
building policies and questions of “stateness” (Mylonas 2012; Soguk 1999; 
Turton 2002). In Ukraine, former Donbas residents are, as carriers of 
potentially dangerous political ideas, also likely to become demonised in the 
tense media atmosphere. It is thus interesting to examine how the state talks 
about IDPs and how the exclusionary practices mentioned above are justified. 
 
I investigate how the Ukrainian state relates to this group of people and 
analyse what its attitudes towards IDPs might mean through a reading of 
selected articles in the government-owned newspaper Uriadovyi Kurier. My 
analysis of this publication shows that the figure of the IDP is used to delimit 
the Ukrainian national unity by excluding “fake IDPs” residing in the occupied 
areas through an association with Russian occupants, separatists, and corrupt 
officials. Conversely, proper IDPs are shown to be hard-working, honest, and 
having pro-Ukrainian sympathies. Inclusion or exclusion in this case is not 
predicated by ethnicity of mother tongue, but by the right kind of movement 
and political choice. In the following section, I will briefly explore some basic 
facts related to the IDP issue, and discuss the observations of non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) working with forced displacement in 
Ukraine. After this, I will move on to discuss the connection between 
displacement and nation-building and present the findings of my analysis in 
more detail. 
 
Background of Donbas displacement 
 
Much has happened since demonstrators occupied regional state 
administration buildings in the Eastern Ukrainian cities of Luhansk and 
Donetsk in spring 2014, triggering a series of armed clashes between 
Ukrainian government forces and local militias covertly backed by Russia. The 
fighting soon escalated into a full-blown war, affecting at least 4.4 million 
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people in total and killing more than 10,200 (situation in September 2017, 
OHCHR 2017). The conflict has caused large-scale displacement both within 
Ukraine and in neighbouring countries, an issue not widely discussed in the 
international media. The occupation of Crimea in March 2014 also prompted 
some 20,000 Crimeans to move to mainland Ukraine (Internal Displacement 
Monitoring Centre 2015). In total, about three million people left Donbas during 
the most active military operations in 2014 and 2015. As the situation has 
been stagnating with little developments either way since early 2015, the 
number of displaced people has been slowly decreasing. Currently there are 
about 1.6 million internally displaced people in Ukraine (UNHCR 2017a). Most 
of the IDPs are within or near the Donbas region itself, and many move 
frequently from government-controlled areas across the “contact line” to 
territories controlled by rebel fighters to check on their property and relatives 
(UN OCHA 2016, 6). As with internal displacement, numbers of Ukrainians 
seeking refuge abroad has been declining. By August 2017, the numbers of 
Ukrainian citizens in external displacement had dropped to about 0.5 million, 
while still in February 2017 it was nearly 1.8 million (UNHCR 2017b; UNHCR 
2017a). The majority of external refugees from Donbas have sought some 
form of legal residence in Russia. By 2016, Russia was hosting over 1.3 million 
displaced Ukrainians (UNHCR 2017b), but many have now returned to 
Ukraine or have been naturalised as citizens and are hence not included in 
the refugee statistics. Current estimates of Ukrainian refugees in Russia hover 
around 400,000 people (UNHCR 2017a). 
 
While this mass displacement has been virtually invisible to audiences in West 
European countries, it was a salient topic in Ukrainian and Russian public 
discussions especially in the early phases of the conflict. The largest instances 
of mass displacement from Donbas took place in August-September 2014 and 
late January 2015, following intensification in fighting and rapid changes in 
battle dynamics (Woroniecka-Krzyzanowska and Palaguta 2017, 6–7). 
Consequently, there was a lot of discussion in the Ukrainian media about the 
phenomenon of internal displacement, and appropriate government response 
to it. At the onset of the crisis, the Ukrainian government lacked institutional 
and procedural mechanisms for dealing with the repercussions of its “anti-
terrorist operation” in the eastern regions (Woroniecka-Krzyzanowska and 
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Palaguta 2017). Because of this, internally displaced persons have sometimes 
lacked access to housing, healthcare, and education, and have sometimes 
failed to receive their pensions and other social benefits. Delivering 
humanitarian aid to the afflicted areas has been hampered by both the 
Ukrainian government and the rebel leadership. Ukraine has at times 
restricted movement of displaced persons between the government-controlled 
area and non-government controlled area (Calabia and Gabaudan 2015). 
IDPs were largely unable to vote in the elections of 2014 because they lacked 
registration documents in their new place of residence (Woroniecka-
Krzyzanowska and Palaguta 2017). The Ukrainian government has been 
criticised for these shortcomings by NGOs working with displacement, 
including the Red Cross and UNHCR. 
 
Of course, the situation with mass displacement has been a shock for Ukraine, 
as it struggles to cope with economic crisis and the reorganisation of the 
country’s political structure. According to Kateryna Ivashchenko-Stadnik, “in 
2015 Ukraine found itself among the five countries in the world with the highest 
number of IDPs associated with conflict and violence (…) and ranks first in 
Europe” (2017, 26). According to NGO and academic research into IDP 
conditions in Ukraine, relations between IDPs and their host communities 
have been complex, with both welcoming and suspicious reactions towards 
the resettled IDPs (IFRC 2015; Ivashchenko-Stadnik 2017). Over time, a 
dynamic change from welcoming reactions and keenness to help to 
increasingly suspicious attitudes towards IDPs has been observed (Bulakh 
2017, 51). According to Tania Bulakh, media narratives on IDPs in Ukraine in 
the beginning of the crisis typically featured positive interpretations of the 
displaced people. Later, negative perceptions of IDPs, influenced by 
stereotypes and rumours, have appeared in the societal imagination (Bulakh, 
2017). While explicit discrimination and negative attitudes toward IDPs are still 
relatively rare in Ukraine, IDPs from the east are sometimes portrayed as 
being criminals and bringing instability to other regions of the country. These 
stereotypes have manifested in discrimination especially in the housing and 
job markets: advertisements for rented apartments in Kyiv, for example, often 
explicitly tell displaced people not to bother (Bulakh 2017, 54). Further, an 
interesting differentiation has appeared between attitudes to IDPs from 
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Crimea and those from Donbas: while those who fled from Crimea are often 
revered as victims of political oppression, IDPs from Donbas are classified as 
a social threat (Bulakh 2017, 49–50). This is motivated by the idea that 
Donbas IDPs are somehow complicit in the conflict in Ukraine’s eastern 
regions. According to Katerina Ivashchenko-Stadnik, “local people’s escape 
from the conflict zone often provokes moral stigma. In a sense, they are seen 
as both victims and perpetrators” (2017, 28). 
 
Ukrainian researchers and NGOs working with displacement observed that 
negative representations of IDPs appeared in Ukrainian media already in 
2014: “In summer 2014 the first cases of discrimination of internally displaced 
persons (IDPs) and media publications that negatively characterize IDPs were 
recorded in Ukraine” (Andreyuk 2015, 3). Typical negative media tropes 
include suspicions of IDPs abusing social benefits and exhibiting anti-
Ukrainian sympathies. Especially after it became evident that the conflict in 
the eastern regions was stalling and that displacement was to be a long-term 
issue, “the overall decreasing quality of life and well-being in Ukraine became 
more frequently blamed on IDPs. Thus, a so-called ‘return of the 90s’ is now 
often framed as IDPs’ fault.” (Bulakh 2017, 55). 
 
It is thus not a surprise that the IDPs’ relationship to the state has been at 
times problematic. IDPs in Ukraine can face a variety problems in their daily 
lives, ranging from registering, finding accommodation and work, continuing 
their education, and placing their children in day-care. NGOs cited problems 
with registration and obtaining IDP status as especially acute in the beginning 
of the conflict, but the government has later issued decrees to facilitate these 
procedures (Ferris et al. 2015; Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 
2016). Nevertheless, 
 
“some of the registered displaced persons have not been resettled: they 
applied for IDP status to claim their social welfare payments in Ukraine (...), 
but have been either unable to rent accommodation or unwilling to abandon 
their dwellings in the occupied territories. As a result, they move back and 
forth with no endeavour to integrate into a new community.” (Ivashchenko-
Stadnik 2017, 28). 
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Despite being citizens of Ukraine and thus entitled to all the same social 
support and benefits as other civilians, IDPs in Ukraine have been forced to 
take extra steps to prove their right for support. IDP registration was 
introduced as a necessary precondition for receiving targeted support in 
October 2014 (Ferris et al. 2015, 9). A government decision harshly criticised 
by NGOs in 2014 was the introduction of Resolutions number 505 and 637, 
which stipulate that the payment of state benefits is conditional on registration 
and residence in government-controlled areas (GCAs) (Ferris et al. 2015, 12). 
This has forced some pensioners and other benefit recipients unable to move 
permanently to GCAs to go back and forth across the contact line to receive 
their benefits. According to both Ukraine’s own pension legislation and 
international agreements signed by Ukraine, claiming benefits should not be 
dependent on place of residence (IDMC 2016, 5). These resolutions were the 
direct cause behind widely-discussed suspicions of benefit fraud, as some 
IDPs living in non-government-controlled areas (NGCAs) began traveling to 
GCAs to collect benefits, to which they were not entitled based on their 
residence status. It also directly caused a wave of internal displacement from 
the rebel-held areas, as especially pensioners were forced to leave their 
homes in order to receive their pensions (Woroniecka-Krzyzanowska and 
Palaguta 2017, 7). These examples may paint a needlessly dark picture of 
IDP adaptation in Ukraine, however, since positive experiences tend to be less 
newsworthy and visible in media and NGO reports. Nonetheless, simply the 
fact that a group of citizens has a different set of rights on paper than others 
because of forced displacement, is reason enough for concern. 
 
Displacement and the nation-state: a chicken and egg problem 
These problems with displacement would seem to be ultimately technical 
issues that the government of Ukraine simply lacked the experience to solve; 
as time passes, the problems should disappear as the state machinery 
becomes more competent in dealing with displacement. However, I argue that 
the question is trickier than that, since the treatment of IDPs goes much 
deeper, to the very justification of the state and its limits. Scholarly discussion 
on forced migration suggests that displaced people, instead of being 
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essentially marginal to states, as they are often portrayed, in fact occupy a 
central place in relation to the state (Soguk 1999; Fassin 2015; Turton 2002). 
Nevzat Soguk proposes that the figure of the refugee is "essential to statecraft, 
particularly at the intergovernmental level" (1999, 244). This is because the 
international system divides the surface of the earth into non-overlapping 
nation-states (typically) in full control of their territories, and assumes a 
relationship of representation between states and their citizens. As argued 
above, people displaced by war make immediately visible the state’s failure to 
control its territory. Further, persons outside of their state or without state 
protection are an abnormality in urgent need of regimenting and controlling, 
so that the system of nation states itself can be protected. Forced 
displacement is thus, according to David Turton, “both a threat to, and a 
product of, the international system of nation-states” (2002, 20). Migration and 
citizenship are the last bastions of state authority: if the state cannot protect 
its territory from outsiders, it does not have a reason to exist (Turton 2002, 
70). 
     
Because of the perceived challenges displaced people pose to the state’s 
authority, states are anxious to limit the danger by subjecting forced migrants 
to various policies regulating their movement and settlement. The range of 
actions available to states to protect themselves from displacement include 
integration, adaptation, and deportation of forced migrants. Unfortunately for 
Ukraine, the IDP is a type of migrant you cannot deport because they are 
citizens of the country. This radically limits the scope of actions available for 
the Ukrainian state, in comparison with, for example, the Russian state which 
can deport unruly migrants at will. I propose that the problems IDPs face in 
Ukraine are related to this dilemma. Since the inconvenient IDPs cannot be 
removed from Ukraine, the state attempts to find other strategies to cope with 
displacement if it cannot easily integrate the IDPs or adapt them and the 
society to each other. For example, it is in the state’s interest to maintain legal 
ambiguities regarding the status of internally displaced people, because this 
ambiguity gives the state some room to manoeuvre vis-à-vis the migrants (see 
Reeves 2013). 
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Furthermore, it has been argued that the contemporary state can be best 
captured and comprehended at its margins, in terms of population, territory, 
and policy (Fassin 2015, 3). That is, the state arguably becomes most visible 
in the way that it treats its marginal populations, including refugees and other 
migrants, because they reveal the tensions between a punitive and welfare 
orientation at the heart of the state (Fassin 2015). In policing populations at its 
perceived borders, the state constructs those exact borders. These 
observations mean, first of all, that there is no forced displacement without 
nation-states, but also that there might not be any nation-states without forced 
displacement; in many cases it is impossible to say which comes first. In the 
next section, I will review the data and methods used to analyse Uriadovyi 
Kurier’s discourse on IDPs. 
 
Data and methods 
 
Because of the connections explored above, I expect that the Ukrainian state’s 
attitudes towards displaced persons from Donbas can offer insights into the 
politics of nation-building in Ukraine. That is, looking at how forced migrants 
are portrayed in government media can bring us closer to understanding the 
ideology of the Ukrainian state regarding the nation and its borders. My 
research questions are: what kind of assumptions become evident in the way 
IDPs are represented in governmental media? What kind of identities are 
created with these narratives? What does the state’s attitude towards IDPs 
tell about the state itself? 
 
To answer these questions, I analysed 86 articles discussing displacement 
from the Donbas region, published in the governmental newspaper Uriadovyi 
Kurier (UK) across a 2-year time period1 . The data collection period spans 
two years from the beginning of the armed clashes in Donbas in early April 
2014 to the end of April 2016. The number of articles published in Uriadovyi 
Kurier in this period amounts to thousands of relevant items, which is more 
than can be meaningfully analysed through qualitative text analysis. This is 
                                                                                                          
1 My data set also included 90 articles from the corresponding Russian newspaper 
Rossiiskaia Gazeta, but I concentrate on the Ukrainian case here.  
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why shorter collection periods were chosen from the beginning, middle, and 
end of the two-year time span. The first collection period is from the beginning 
of April to the end of June 2014, when displacement from Donbas was 
becoming a mass phenomenon for the first time. Two natural data collection 
points in the middle of the collection period are around the Minsk agreements, 
first in September 2014 and then in February 2015. The final collection period 
spans from the beginning of January to the end of April 2016, after which the 
situation has remained at a deadlock with little development either way. The 
articles were found in UK’s web archive using the search function. Search 
queries used included words like refugees (bizhentsi), “settlers” (pereselentsi), 
involuntary migrants (vymusheni pereselentsi) and IDPs (vnutrishnio 
peremishcheni osoby) as well as their derivatives. 
 
The articles were saved as PDF files into the data analysis software NVivo for 
qualitative coding. Following a coding methodology used by Hutchings and 
Tolz (2015), the main theme or topic of the articles was identified from the 
headline and content and coded into a main topic category in NVivo. When an 
article contained several themes, the more prominent one was selected so 
that each article was coded only once. Before data collection, I developed a 
deductive set of codes based on my research questions in addition to previous 
research, and proceeded with identifying further codes from the text. The main 
deductive codes included the tone of the article towards the displaced persons 
(either positive, neutral, or negative), the displacement keyword used to 
address the displaced persons (settlers/migrants, refugees, IDPs, or other), 
and some of the themes in category later named “necessities of life” (for 
example employment, healthcare, and education). While reading the articles, 
I developed new codes and ways to group previously appointed codes. One 
especially important set of codes obtained as a result of inductive coding was 
the Actors category, identifying the main active subject dealing with the issue 
of displacement. These include the involuntary migrants themselves, regional 
administration, state or presidential administration, volunteers, friends and 
relatives, foreign states, migration services, and others. Coding finally 
produced three parent categories for the main article topics: Crisis 
Management, Politicisation of Migration, Society-Migrant Relations, and the 
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category Other for articles that did not neatly fit with any of the main 
categories. 
  
After qualitative content analysis, the data was also analysed using the tools 
of ideological discourse analysis (IDA). The added value of conducting both 
qualitative content analysis and ideological discourse analysis with the same 
data is that while the first approach identifies salient themes in the publication, 
the latter shows how exactly these discourses work, and what is being 
achieved through them. Ideological discourse analysis is a theory of identity 
construction in politics. Politics in this case is understood in a very broad sense 
as any practice concerned with dynamics of power in human societies, not 
just parliamentary politics or the operation of political institutions. The concept 
of discourse itself here refers to not only textual forms of communication, but 
any “relational systems of meaning and practice that constitute the identities 
of subjects and objects” (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000, 9). In this sense, the 
structure of a party system or the social dynamics of a classroom can 
constitute a type of discourse. The case at hand is of course more traditional, 
as I am analysing text produced by a rather overtly political actor. What I 
concentrate on, however, is not so much the referential content of the political 
messages the newspaper produces, but the kinds of political identities it is 
attempting to construct. 
 
A central concept for the creation of political identities in ideological discourse 
analysis is the empty signifier (Laclau 2007, 70–71). The operating logic of 
this concept is based on Ferdinand de Saussure’s assertion that language, 
and in Laclau’s view, any signifying system, is fundamentally a system of 
differences. Linguistic identities, or values, are purely relational, and the 
totality of language is involved in each single act of signification (Laclau 1996). 
In a system like this, the only possible relations between items of a signifying 
system are equivalence or difference, which are mutually exclusive 
relationships. Either two items are different and separate, or they are 
equivalent and essentially the same. Each element of the system has an 
identity only so far as it is different from the others. Herein lies a dilemma, 
however: there can only be a coherent system of elements if there is 
something that is outside of that system, that is, if something is excluded. In 
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human interactions, limitless systems of relation, as exemplified by the 
concept of an infinite universe in physics, are impossible. This is where empty 
signifiers come in: as markers of the “outside”, they reveal the unity of the 
system. The exclusion of an element grounds the system as such: "Only if the 
beyond becomes the signifier of pure threat, of pure negativity, of the simply 
excluded, can there be limits and system" (Laclau 1996, 38). This necessary 
distinction between the in- and out-group can be articulated with the help of 
empty signifiers (Laclau 1996). 
 
The main requirement for an empty signifier is, as the concept suggests, 
notional emptiness. An empty signifier lacks a signified. According to David 
Howarth and Yannis Stavrakakis, “the articulation of [any] political discourse 
can only take place around an empty signifier that functions as a nodal point. 
In other words, emptiness is now revealed as an essential quality of the nodal 
point, as an important condition of possibility for its hegemonic success.” 
(2000, 13). For example, the notion of “the people” is a commonly used empty 
signifier especially among populist movements: political actors often make 
extensive reference to “the people”, but never define or interpret the concept. 
It can mean whatever the audience wants it to mean, which can be as many 
things as there are people in the audience. Because the notion is emptied of 
all particular meaning, it can function as a unifying node, as the success of 
various populist movements attests. However, populist movements do not 
have a monopoly on using empty signifiers, as political identity projects of all 
kind are necessarily built around empty signifiers (Norval 2000, 220). Further, 
populism, the practice of creating political identities around empty signifiers, 
is the very act of constituting the unity of a group, not simply the mobilisation 
of an already existing group (Laclau 2007, 73). Thus, “‘the people’ is not 
something of the nature of an ideological expression, but a real relation 
between social agents.” (ibidem). Empty signifiers do not summon pre-existing 
social groups, they create them. 
 
 
Further, the construction of social divisions, or othering, is crucial for the 
stabilisation of the discursive system. Such social antagonism shows itself 
through the production of political frontiers: political division lines built between 
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a united inside and an excluded outside, articulated with the help of the empty 
signifier. In this process, “[s]ocial antagonism involves the exclusion of a 
series of identities and meanings that are articulated as part of a chain of 
equivalence, which emphasize the ‘sameness’ of the excluded elements.” 
(Torfing 2005, 15). The concepts of empty signifier and political frontier are 
specifically useful for the Ukrainian case, because they expose the way 
political identities are constructed through equation and exclusion. Ukrainian 
authorities are in a difficult position because, on the one hand, alienating the 
residents of Donbas from the Ukrainian nation would pre-empt the war effort, 
but on the other hand, the situation offers the perfect opportunity for nation-
building through exclusion of the separatists. Armed with these analytical 
notions, we can move on to consider Uriadovyi Kurier’s representation of IDPs 
in practice. 
 
Representations of Donbas IDPs: from victims to crooks 
 
Analysing the articles using ideological discourse analysis, I found that 
Uriadovyi Kurier attempts to construct Ukrainian national unity by drawing a 
political frontier between “real” and “fake” IDPs, that is, those who have 
relocated to government-controlled areas, and those who have not. In the 
newspaper’s reporting, Ukrainian national unity is delimited with the figure of 
the ‘fake’ IDP, acting as an empty signifier. The ‘fake’ IDP is juxtaposed from 
‘honest’ IDPs entitled to benefits, and is equated with terrorists, corruption, 
and rebels backed by Russia. This act of social othering is not articulated in 
the language of ethnicity, language choice, or religion, but is determined by 
political loyalties. The choice to flee west to government-controlled areas, east 
to Russia, or to stay put in the NGCA thus justifies the civilians’ inclusion into 
the in-group, or exclusion from national unity. 
 
Interestingly, this conclusion only emerges gradually: Uriadovyi Kurier’s 
representation of IDPs changes over time from moderately positive to a more 
polarised picture between extremely positive and extremely negative. For 
example, in summer 2014, articles describing life in displacement portray the 
IDPs largely in a positive manner and often mention how their political outlook 
has changed from agnosticism to active support of the Ukrainian nation as a 
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result of the conflict. A long story from June 2014 describes how those fleeing 
the war do not complain about anything and are only grateful for help: “The 
main thing is being alive; Dnipropetrovsk people have greeted us so well,” 
says Liudmila, an IDP from Donbas (UK 27/06/2014). Almost without 
exception, the involuntary migrants interviewed in these stories were, or had 
recently turned into proponents of the Ukrainian central state. Uridovyi Kurier 
seems eager to show that politically loyal IDPs are entitled to aid from the 
state. 
 
Further, many articles published in 2014 feature mentions of alleged 
repression of pro-Ukrainian people in Donbas and occupied Crimea, and 
include explicit calls to strengthen national unity. An article from 27 June 2014 
recounts the story of Tetiana from Kramatorsk, who was forced with her family 
to leave their house after the referendum about DNR’s status the previous 
May, as Tetiana’s husband was a member of the well-known Dnipro battalion 
in the Ukrainian army and her son a scout in a nationalist scout organisation. 
Tetiana says that after their departure from Kramatorsk, her son's scout friend 
was arrested and questioned about him. She says her family did not realise 
they were pro-Ukrainian until the recent events (UK 27/06/2014). One article, 
commenting on procedures of accepting IDP students to universities in 
September 2014, ends with a moralistically coloured lecture about national 
unity and the inadmissibility of giving in to enemy propaganda among 
students: 
 
“[The problem] is about dividing [people] into one's own and strangers (podil 
na svoyikh ta chuzhikh). Of course, it is difficult to find yourself in the regions 
which are, according to enemy propaganda, opposed to you. But we must 
remember that this is a lie, that we are all one people. Residents of the East 
sometimes face a prejudiced attitude from the side of people from other 
regions, laid down on the soil prepared by propaganda. Usually they are 
blamed for what happened, or for an atrophied sense of patriotism. There is 
only one solution here – do not play into the hands of the enemy, do not give 
in to provocations.” (UK 03/09/2014) 
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This concern with ensuring national unity by urging IDPs and those 
encountering them to surpass the false notion of an internal division in the 
Ukrainian society, created by Russian propaganda, amounts to a hegemonic 
struggle for identity (Torfing 2005). The division between East and rest, 
traditionally seen as one of the major fault lines of political opinion in Ukraine, 
is rejected in exchange for the idea of a unified nation. The author argues that 
newcomers from the East need to be patiently explained how volunteers are 
helping at the front and through various organisations, so that the IDPs too 
can understand the importance of unity at the face of adversity (UK 
03/09/2014). Thus in 2014 at least, there was a clear attempt to integrate IDPs 
from Donbas into the Ukrainian political community. 
 
These rather positive representations of IDPs as politically loyal to the 
Ukrainian central state slowly give way to more negative and ambivalent 
representations over time. The themes of IDP employment and adaptation 
issues were often discussed in Uriadovyi Kurier in 2015. These topics evoked 
both sympathy and suspicion towards the IDPs, who were seen alternatingly 
as victims of unfair stereotypes and dishonest about their qualifications and 
prone to blame others for their problems. By 2016, the trope of ‘fake’ IDPs as 
funders of terrorism emerges as a dominant theme in the newspaper’s 
reporting, alongside articles about engaging foreign governments and aid 
organisations in managing the IDP issue. As mentioned earlier, NGOs argue 
that the problem of ‘fake’ IDPs in Ukraine is a direct result of Cabinet of 
Ministers resolutions 505 and 637, which establish residence and registration 
in government-controlled areas as a prerequisite for claiming any kind of 
benefits (IDMC 2016; Ferris et al. 2015). The resolutions created new IDPs 
and forced people remaining behind the contact line and either unable or 
unwilling to permanently move to GCAs to shuttle back and forth across the 
contact line to claim their pensions and other benefits, and often to use the 
services of semi-legal middlemen to obtain registration documents in the 
GCAs. To curb these informal practices, in February 2016 the government 
suspended the payment of social benefits to 150,000 people and implemented 
a verification procedure for IDPs’ registration documents as a condition for 
continuing payments (IDMC 2016). 
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These investigations were eagerly discussed in UK in early 2016. Ukraine’s 
difficulties with the state budget, drained by the conflict, was often mentioned 
as justification for these measures. The alleged fake IDPs themselves are 
never interviewed in UK, nor are their motivations discussed or interpreted. In 
a couple of articles, the authors express sympathy with those wrongfully 
included on the lists of people whose benefit payments have been suspended 
because of fraud investigations. For example, an article from March 2016 
reports that IDP pensioners are contacting the offices of the state Pension 
Fund en masse to resume their pension payments, which has resulted in 
massive queues. The article cites local activists, according to whom every 
morning hundreds of elderly people queue at the door before opening hours, 
in frost, with nowhere to sit, and guards only let a few people inside the office 
at once. Local activists are trying to defend the right of the elderly to queue 
indoors (UK 30/03/2016). At the same time, other articles on the topic discuss 
the clever methods of misappropriation used by the fraudsters, who appear 
as nothing short of hardened criminals. The fraudsters are said to cooperate 
with corrupt officials in regional branches of state institutions. According to the 
Minister of Social policy Pavlo Rozenko, who is quoted in several articles, 
huge criminal schemes have been built on distributing assistance to IDPs, with 
multibillion sums in circulation. Rozenko claims that some of these funds from 
the Ukrainian budget and Ukrainian taxpayers flow into the pockets of corrupt 
officials, terrorists and Russian invaders (UK 19/04/2016). A careful 
differentiation is thus anxiously crafted in these articles between ‘fake’ IDPs 
and actual ones ones in need of help. 
 
The figure of the IDP in this discourse can be interpreted as a floating signifier, 
that is, a signifier without a singular, unambiguous signified: the signifying 
relationship between IDPs and the group of people it refers to is contested. 
Perhaps this is the reason why the legalistic term IDP (vnutrishnio 
peremisheni osoby) appears so rarely in Uriadovyi Kurier’s articles, and more 
vague words like migrant or settler (pereselentsi) are used instead. The UN 
definition of an IDP includes everyone displaced from their habitual place of 
residence without crossing an internationally recognised state border, 
regardless of their new place of residence (UNHCR 2004). In Uriadovyi Kurier, 
this inclusive definition is contested: only people living in government-
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controlled areas are counted as IDPs, and those who have been displaced 
inside rebel-held areas are demonised as ‘fake’ IDPs. A representative from 
the state security service of Ukraine (SBU), commenting on the investigations 
into alleged benefit fraud, stated in February 2016: “Now that Ukraine is at war 
with an aggressor, in our state budget every penny is important. I responsibly 
emphasize: we do not threaten decent people (poriadny liudy) who migrated 
from the occupied territories to safe areas and actually live there” (UK 
27/02/2016, emphasis added). The implications of this statement are evident: 
those IDPs conforming to the state definition are honest, decent people, who 
can be included in the national unity of Ukraine, while false IDPs staying in 
rebel-held areas are not. 
 
The figure of the ‘fake’ IDP, in turn, can be seen as a constitutive myth in the 
hegemonic struggle to build a political identity in Uriadovyi Kurier’s discursive 
system. As argued above, no coherent identity can exist without the exclusion 
of something else, which thus articulates the limits of that identity. For a 
national unity to exist in Ukraine, and for the IDPs to be included in that unity, 
some elements have to be excluded. This is where the empty signifier of ‘fake’ 
IDPs comes in handy: the category of the ‘fake’ IDP absorbs all politically 
suspicious migrants from the combat zone. Furthermore, a chain of 
equivalence is constructed between ‘fake’ IDPs, professional criminals 
involved in organising the benefit fraud schemes, corrupt officials, and finally 
the “terrorists” directly or indirectly benefiting from the money flows to NGCAs. 
Kateryna Ivashchenko-Stadnik seems correct in her statement that “in a state-
sponsored war, civilians living in the enemy camp, even if they are not 
engaged in hostilities, are conceived by the other side as ‘failed citizens’” 
(2017, 27). 
 
In conclusion, the above analysis shows that UK’s portrayal of IDPs has a 
specific role in consolidating Ukraine’s state-building project. The IDPs’ 
representation changes from a relatively benevolent picture to a more 
polarised one. If in the beginning of the crisis, people fleeing from Crimea and 
Donbas are primarily portrayed positively as victims of oppression who made 
the conscious decision to align themselves with the unitary Ukrainian state, 
later Uriadovyi Kurier’s reporting concentrates solely on ‘fake’ IDPs and 
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foreign help in dealing with displacement. A political frontier is constructed 
between Ukrainian national unity, exemplified by selfless volunteers and 
“honest, hard-working” IDPs who fled to GCAs (and stayed there) on the one 
hand, and the thieving ‘fake’ IDPs, corrupt officials, and Russian occupiers, 
on the other. Unfortunately for the IDPs living in NGCAs, they are the 
constitutive outside of the political identity that UK constructs. These findings 
testify how struggles with state-building become acutely visible through 
displacement. As in Elizabeth Dunn’s research on IDPs in Georgia (2012), 
managing the issue of internal displacement is also tied to geopolitical 
orientation in Ukraine: by involving Western states as partners and donors in 
IDP assistance programmes, Ukraine can tie itself tighter to the West. 
 
 
Statecraft versus statehood 
 
Looking at the articles across the two-year observation period, it is evident 
that the Donbas crisis expedites the process of Ukrainian nation-building. The 
initially fuzzy categories slowly change into an increasingly solid political 
division dividing Ukrainian national unity from its enemies, embodied in the 
figure of the ‘fake’ IDP. This is in line with other research on the Donbas 
conflict (see e.g. Riabchuk, 2015; Uehling, 2017). Greta Uehling argues that 
“after the conflict with Russia in the east and the occupation of Crimea in the 
south, there is a clearer sense of what it means to be Ukrainian emerging.” 
(2017, 70). Indeed, as Rogers Brubaker argues, high levels of group 
consciousness may be the result of ethnic conflict, rather than the other way 
around (2004, 19). My analysis of UK reporting reinforces these conclusions 
and shows how, exactly, this emerging “groupness” is discursively 
constructed. 
 
Thus, the IDPs are relevant to the way in which the Ukrainian state attempts 
to negotiate its relationship to its citizens. What Uriadovyi Kurier discusses 
less in connection with the displacement crisis is the state’s capacity to 
manage it, in contrast to the corresponding Russian publication Rossiiskaia 
Gazeta, which devotes a lot of attention to this topic. The discourse on 
displacement in both publications does appear to relate to the state, but from 
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different angles. As we saw, in Ukraine the internally displaced are portrayed 
through a discourse of Ukrainian nationhood, either including them as hard-
working and honest people, or excluding them as ‘fake’ IDPs. In Rossiiskaia 
Gazeta, the refugees from Donbas evoke assurances of the Russian state’s 
ability to govern it. Stef Jansen, discussing his informants’ desires for “normal 
lives” in Bosnia and Herzegovina, argues for analytically distinguishing 
between two aspects of the state: statehood and statecraft (2015). According 
to Jansen, questions of statehood relate to what the state is, claims to be, and 
should be: they explore the legitimacy of a polity and its administrative-
territorial anatomy, for example, questions of sovereignty and representation 
in identarian terms (2015, 12). Statecraft, in turn, is concerned with what the 
state does, claims to do, and should do; in a word, state capacity. Key 
concerns of statecraft are the provision of material conditions and temporal 
structures for the unfolding of ‘normal lives’ (ibidem). Against this analytical 
background, it is quite clear that Uriadovyi Kurier’s articles on IDPs from 
Donbass primarily deal with statehood, while Rossiiskaia Gazeta essentially 
discusses statecraft through its representation of Ukrainian refugees. 
 
It is intriguing that the Ukrainian and Russian government newspapers would 
in this context emphasise opposite aspects of the state, despite high salience 
of the other aspects in society. Media analyses from Russia and Ukraine 
indicate that the representation of forcibly displaced persons from Donbas has 
been connected, among other issues, to questions of state capacity in Ukraine 
and to the nation-building agenda in Russia (Mukomel 2016; Mukomel 2017; 
Andreyuk 2015; Ivashchenko-Stadnik 2017). In the case of these 
governmental newspapers, the situation appears to be completely reversed: 
the Ukrainian paper is mostly concerned with questions of nationhood, while 
the Russian paper uses the issue of displacement to discuss state capacity. 
This is remarkable because the issue of state capacity, especially in relation 
to corruption, is a persistent topic of political discussion in Ukraine. It is odd 
indeed that the Ukrainian paper devotes so little attention to questions of 
statecraft, even though Euromaidan, the “revolution of dignity,” started out as 
a protest against corruption, clearly a question of statecraft, rather than 
provoked by identarian questions. Like the 2004 Orange Revolution, which 
had similar motivations, the Euromaidan eventually failed to deliver any 
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substantial chance in state institutions and to end corruption. It did briefly 
change those in power, but the political leaders lacked either the will or the 
understanding of how to change Ukraine’s extractive institutions. The state 
institutions changed hands, but that did not lead to change of the institutions 
themselves. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The above discussion shows that the way in which internally displaced people 
are represented is not incidental. I have argued that the moral panic 
surrounding ‘fake’ IDPs as collaborators of terrorism is not just a question of 
scarce resources, it is an attempt to carve out the national community by 
delimiting its borders. In this nation-building exercise, finding political outsiders 
in the figure of the ‘fake’ IDPs, corrupt officials, and Russian-backed 
separatists matter more than concerns regarding statecraft. Of course, one 
could also argue that Uriadovyi Kurier is worried about state capacity, since 
the IDPs are presented as a strain on resources and the newspaper discusses 
ways to engage foreign donors in solving the issue. However, the state’s 
solutions to the IDP issue are not dependent on the state itself: the solution is 
either exclusion of IDPs of the wrong kind, or increasing state capacity not by 
restructuring the state’s institutions, but by involving foreign states and the civil 
society. Instead of reforming the state machinery, the government outsources 
the solution. The extreme way in which civilians attempting to gain access to 
their (earned) benefits become demonised in Uriadovyi Kurier and Ukrainian 
society in general is an effect of anxieties surrounding nation-building. For 
historical and contingent reasons, this discourse is not shaped around the 
issue of ethnicity or for example language choice: framing the exclusion in 
ethnic terms would immediately justify the Russian claim that ethnic Russians 
or Russian-speakers are in danger of oppression in Ukraine. 
 
For post-Euromaidan Ukraine, questions of statecraft would seem equally if 
not more pressing than identarian questions about statehood. However, the 
problems with corruption and the state’s capacity to function like a “normal” 
state remain largely unresolved. Instead, groupist concerns with, for example, 
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nationality and state language, dominate in the public sphere. The 
developments in Ukrainian society since 2014 have been interpreted in 
nationalist terms not only in Ukrainian domestic discourse, but also in the 
international press and the Russian media. According to Richard Sakwa, 
 
“The Association Agreement offered by the EU in the framework of the Eastern 
Partnership proposed a lifeline to break out from the corruption and economic 
degradation in which Ukraine had been mired for so long. The original idealism 
of the Maidan protests was based on the profound repudiation of the failures 
of the past, but its idealism was not rooted in a substantive real political 
constituency. It was not able to sustain a political formation that could 
institutionalise its idealism” (2015, 269). 
 
Instead, the Maidan protest movement became radicalised along the lines of 
Ukrainian nationalism (ibidem). This shows how easily nationalist rhetoric can 
mobilise people and demobilise alternative politics (Jansen 2015, 10). It is 
then probably not a surprise that the reporting on displacement in Uriadovyi 
Kurier attempts to make even the question of corruption into an issue of 
nationhood by equating corrupt officials with the separatists and excluding 
them from Ukrainian national unity. 
 
The reasons for determinedly ignoring questions of statecraft in the 
government newspaper can be only speculated here, but journalists and 
analysts have paid attention to the new government’s failure to curb corruption 
and enact any kind of permanent change after the Maidan revolution. Former 
president of Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili, who was appointed the governor of 
Odesa in May 2015, publicly complained that Ukraine’s government is not 
even trying to change corrupt institutions and that in fact both central and 
regional level politicians actively resist anti-corruption measures (Saakashvili 
2016). Thomas de Waal, senior fellow at Carnegie Europe, notes that “the 
Ukrainian public is increasingly frustrated and cynical, perceiving that much of 
the old predatory political class has survived into the post-2014 era and that 
the fundamentals of the old system remain unchanged.” (2016). Disbanding 
former president Yanukovych’s Party of Regions and the Communist Party of 
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Ukraine has not stopped politicians from these parties from appearing in the 
Rada under different parties. 
 
Also, IDPs themselves have lamented the state’s scant resources for assisting 
displaced people. While the crisis has contributed to the development of a 
civic Ukrainian identity, “there is deep disenchantment [among Crimean IDPs] 
with the Ukrainian state that manifests itself most strongly in feelings of having 
been abandoned and betrayed by the government.” (Uehling 2017, 63). 
According to Uehling, the government’s failure to implement an effective policy 
response to internal displacement has effectively made IDPs second class 
citizens by depriving them of voting rights, access to state-funded education 
and sometimes to even their own funds in Crimean banks (2017, 67). The 
government is no doubt aware of these shortcomings and of the popular mood 
regarding persistent corruption. The reluctance to discuss corruption or state 
capacity in the government publication does not need to be motivated by a 
conscious attempt to deflect attention away from the issue, but at the least it 
is obvious that it may be an inconvenient topic in an era of institutional change. 
 
The obsession with aspects of statehood, such as the country’s new language 
laws, might thus obscure Ukraine’s more formidable problems with statecraft, 
especially corruption and weak institutions. Politicians in Ukraine have 
regularly exploited the country’s ethnic, linguistic, and regional diversity in 
elections, but there is contradictory evidence of the importance of these 
cleavages to the average citizen. Both the Orange revolution in 2004 and the 
Euromaidan revolution in 2014 were sparked by the popular sentiment that 
the citizens were not in fact in control of their own country and lacked the 
means to have any impact on politics. Unfortunately, both upheavals have 
failed to address the root causes of Ukraine’s persistent underperformance, 
such as institutional design, quality of democracy, and rule of law. The hopes 
and failures of both the Orange and Maidan revolution shows that Ukrainians 
are acutely aware of the reasons behind the poverty and inequality prevalent 
in their country, but the incentives for maintaining the country’s extractive 
institutions, benefiting the few, are too high for those in power. 
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